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FEDERAL TAX COLLECTION CONTROVERSIES
IN THE ERA OF DRYE
By Steve Johnson

kgeneral

By "tax collection controversies," I mean cases in which it has been established that the
taxpayer owes additional taxes, those taxes remain unpaid, and the IRS is attempting to enforce
collection out of the taxpayer's assets. Such cases are numerous and involve attorneys in
legal practice as well as tax specialists. For example, the taxpayer may be your client
for non-tax matters, and may expect you to handle her tax collection controversy as well.
,& Or, your client may not be the taxpayer herself, but instead someone who co-owns property
with the taxpayer. Your client expects you to make sure that his interest is not impermissibly
infringed if the IRS tries to effect collection out of the taxpayer's interest in the jointly
owned property. Or, the taxpayer owes money to your client as well as to the IRS, such that
your client and the IRS are competing for assets that, typically, are insufficient to satisfy all
the claims against or debts of the taxpayer. Or, your client may be a financial institution or

other party holding assets of the taxpayer, and the IRS has served a notice of levy on your
client to satisfy tax liabilities out of those assets. In short, attorneys in general practice as
well as tax specialists often need to understand the rules governing tax collection by the IRS.
The IRS can effect enforced collection only out of assets to which its tax lien attaches. Fairly
recently, in December 1999, the Supreme Court handed down a landmark decision clarifying the
reach of the federal tax lien: Drye v. United States.1 After providing background, this column
describes Drye and contemporary tax lien analysis in light of its teaching.
I. Background
Under I.R.C. § 6321, the general
federal tax lien2 attaches to "all
property and rights to property,
whether real or personal" belonging
to the taxpayer. The Supreme Court
has emphasized that this language "is
broad and reveals on its face that
Congress meant to reach every
interest in property a taxpayer might
have."3 The lien arises upon
assessment of the tax by the IRS,
followed by failure to pay the
amount after the IRS makes notice
and demand for payment on the
taxpayer. Once it arises, the lien
relates back to the date of
assessment. 4 It attaches to property
owned by the taxpayer as of that
date as well as after-acquired
property.
Once the lien attaches, it
remains on the property even if
conveyed to another person. The tax
lien generally has priority over
subsequently perfected claims and

judgments, although filing of a
notice of tax lien may be required to
achieve priority over certain classes
of competing claims. 5 Once the lien
attaches, the IRS has a variety of
options against the property,
including administrative levy and
sale under I.R.C. § 6331 and seeking
judicial sale and apportionment of
proceeds under I.R.C. § 7403.

Drye was such a case. Rohn E
Drye, Jr. had unpaid federal tax
assessments of approximately
$325,000. The IRS had filed liens
against him, but it had little prospect
of being paid since Mr. Drye was
insolvent. Thereafter, Drye's mother
died intestate, leaving an estate
worth over $230,000. He was her
sole heir and the administrator of her
estate. Six months later, Drye

II. Drye
A. Facts
Given the broad language of §
6321, it usually is clear that the lien
attaches to property the IRS seeks to
reach. However, whether a given
interest of the taxpayer constitutes
"property [or] rights to property" has
been litigated in hundreds of cases,
especially when the interest is less
than full and possessory or when
state law limits the ability of
creditors to proceed against the
interest.

disclaimed any interest in his
mother's estate. The disclaimer was
effective under state (Arkansas) law.
Two days after that, Drye resigned as
administrator - to be succeeded by
his daughter.
This disclaimer caused Drye's
mother's estate to pass to Drye's
daughter. In short order, she
established the Drye Family 1995
Trust. She used the proceeds of the
estate to fund the trust. The
daughter and her parents (including
Mr. Drye) were the beneficiaries of
the trust. Mr. Drye's attorney was the
trustee. He had discretion to make
continued on page 16
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distributions to the beneficiaries for
their health, maintenance, and
support. The trust was a spendthrift
trust, its assets shielded under state
law from creditors of the
beneficiaries.
The IRS filed a notice of tax lien
against the trust, asserting that the
trust was Drye's nominee. The IRS
also served a notice of levy on
accounts held in the trust's name by
an investment bank. In response,
the trust filed a wrongful levy suit
under I.R.C. § 7426(a) in federal
district court. The IRS
counterclaimed against the trust, its
trustees, and its beneficiaries. It
sought to reduce to judgment its
assessments against Drye, to confirm
its right to levy on the trust assets in
order to satisfy the assessments, to
foreclose on its liens, and to sell the
trust property.
As is the case in most states,
Arkansas law provides that a
disclaimer "relates back for all
purpose to the date of death of the
decedent,"6 creating the legal fiction
that the disclaimant predeceased the
decedent. Thus, Drye contended that
he never had a property interest in
his mother's estate, so there was
nothing to which the tax liens
against him could attach.
The IRS rejoined that its liens
attached to Drye's interest in the
estate as of his mother's death and
that Drye's later disclaimer could not
remove them. The IRS based its
argument on the principle that
substance prevails over legal fictions
in tax and the rule that, once the tax
lien attaches, it remains on the
property until released or satisfied by
payment. 7
Upon cross-motions for summary
judgment, the district court held for
the IRS. The Eighth Circuit
affirmed. The Supreme Court
unanimously affirmed. As described
below, the Court's opinion clarifies
tax lien analysis in two principal
respects: (1) the respective roles of
16
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federal law and state law and (2) the
definition of "property" and "rights
to property."
B. State Versus Federal Law
To what extent does federal tax lien
analysis incorporate or depend on
state law property r.

taxpayer possesses rise to the level of
being "property" or "rights to
property" under § 6321? If so, the tax
lien attaches. In that event, (3) one
must ask: what action can the IRS
take against the underlying property
and what safeguards or protections
are available to the taxpayer and
third parties against such actions?
It also is clear that only the first
of these stages involves state law.
Once it has been determined what
powers the taxpayer has, recourse
to state law ends. All further
matters - whether of
characterization (property right
or not) or consequences (IRS
options, and protections for the
taxpayer and third parties) turn on federal law only.

C. "Property" and "Rights
to Property"
debtor-creditor
rules? As the Court itself
acknowledged in Drye, s its prior
decisions sometimes contained loose
or imprecise language, leading to
confusion as to this question in the
lower courts. Drye should put such
confusion to rest. The Court
declared: "The Internal Revenue
Code's prescriptions are most
sensibly read to look to state law for
delineation of the taxpayer's rights or
interests, but to leave to federal law
the determination whether those
rights or interests constitute
'property' or 'rights to property'
within the meaning of § 6321." 9
In light of Drye, it now is clear
that three stages of analysis exist in
tax lien controversies: (1) One first
must ascertain what, if any, interest
the delinquent taxpayer has in the
underlying property from which the
IRS seeks to effect collection. Can
the taxpayer possess, use, control, or
benefit from the property, or prevent
others from doing so? If so, how? (2)
Next, one must ask a haracterization
question: do whatever powers the

As seen, the stage two
characterization question is a
function of federal law. But what
exactly rises to "property" or "rights
to property" for § 6321 purposes?
Neither the Code nor the
Regulations promulgated under it
define these terms.
Although Drye did not propound
comprehensive definitions, it did
shed light on the characterization
issue. Without committing to them,
the Court reprised criteria of
property advanced in other cases,
including: "every species of right or
interest protected by law and having
an exchangeable value," a right to
gain possession of an item, even if
possession does not amount to
ownership, items "within [the
taxpayer's] reach to enjoy," "any
beneficial interest as opposed to bare
legal title, in the asset at issue," "a
valuable, transferable, legally
protected right to the property at
issue," "rights or interests that have
pecuniary value and are transferable," and something beyond a
mere expectancy. 10

However, these formulations are
not to be applied in a wooden or
mechanical fashion. Not all of the
indicia may be necessary. For
instance, the Court remarked: "We
do not mean to suggest that
transferability is essential to the
existence of 'property' or 'rights to
property' under [§ 6321J."11
D. Application to the Facts
Let's see how the Court applied
these two levels of teaching - the
relation of federal and state law and
the meaning of property and
property rights - to the facts of Drye.
(1) At stage one, the Court
noted that the applicable state law
gave Mr. Drye two strings or powers
over the $230,000 constituting his
mother's estate. First, he had the
ability to do nothing, i.e., not to
disclaim, in which case the estate
would go to him. Second, he had the
ability to disclaim, the effect of
which would be to "channel the
inheritance to a close family member
(the next lineal descendant),"
specifically Mr. Drye's daughter.12
These strings or powers having been
ascertained, state law - including the
fiction that Mr. Drye is viewed as
having predeceased his mother and
the spendthrift restrictions 13 - ceased
to be relevant and all further
questions were matters of federal law.
(2) At stage two, the Court held
that, taken together, the two abilities
gave Mr. Drye a "control rein" over
the property, a "power to channel"
the $230,000,14 and that this power
had "considerable value."15 This, the
Court held, "warrants the conclusion
that Drye held 'property' or a 'righ[t]
to property,"' under a federal
definition of these terms. 16 This
conclusion is fully consistent with
criteria of property, federally defined
for § 6231 purposes, that we earlier
saw the Drye Court distilled
illustratively from prior cases. (i) Mr.
Drye's "control rein" surely was a
"species of right or interest protected
by law," and, by virtue of the ability

to disclaim, it was exchangeable or
transferable, at least to one person:
the next lineal descendant. (ii) Mr.
Drye had a right to gain possession of
the $230,000, by choosing not to
disclaim. (iii) Similarly, the
$230,000 was "within [Mr. Drye's]
reach to enjoy." (iv) Mr. Drye's
interest was beneficial, not merely
legal. (v) Mr. Drye's right was
"valuable, transferable [at least to
one other, and] legally protected."
(vi) Mr. Drye's interest was
something beyond a mere
expectancy.
(3) At stage three, since Mr.
Drye had a § 6321 properties right,
the federal tax liens against him
attached to the $230,000. Since the
lien travels with the property once it
attaches, the liens could not be
defeated by Mr. Drye's transfer, via
the disclaimer, of the property into
another's (the daughter's) hands nor
by her subsequent transfer of the
property into yet another's (the
trust's) hands. The government
could reduce to judgment its
assessment against Drye, could levy
on the trust assets to satisfy those
assessments, could foreclose on its
liens, and could sell the trust
property, since all of those are postlien attachment powers that federal
law, specifically the Internal
Revenue Code, confers on the IRS.17
III. Conclusion
Drye fundamentally clarifies the
standards governing federal tax lien
controversies. Dozens of lower court
decisions have applied its teaching,18
and in the main have done so
correctly.19 Drye will shape this area
of the law for decades to come.
The author is a professor of Law at the
William S. Boyd School of Law at
UNLV. A 1981 graduate of New York
University School of Law, he practiced
tax law in private practice, as a senior
attorney with the office of chief counsel
of the Internal Revenue Service, and as
a Special Assistant United States

Attorney. He has taught at Indiana
University School of Law Bloomington and the Illinois Institute of
Technology, Chicago-Kent College of
Law.
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